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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
SALT LAKE TRANSPORTATION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EM-
PLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
8442 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of 
Review of the Industrial Commission affirming a written 
opinion of L. Stanford Wooten, Appeals Referee of the 
Department of Employment Security, which held plaintiff 
responsible for payment of unemployment compensation 
taxes based on the earnings of drivers who leased cabs from 
Salt Lake Transportation Company. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
For many years, Salt Lake Transportation Company 
has held nontransferable franchises from the Utah Public 
Service Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission and 
Salt Lake City to operate taxicabs, known as Yell ow Cabs, 
in Salt Lake City and surrounding areas. It owns and 
maintains taxicabs and prior to 1\larch 1, 1955, employed 
drivers on a commision basis to operate its cabs, paying 
unemployment compensation taxes on such wages. Because 
of competitive conditions, on March 1, 1955, the company 
changed its method of operation. Since that da~e, cabs have 
been leased to drivers under the lease agreement set out 
in the Record, pp. 10-12. No wages are paid to the drivers. 
The drivers pay a daily rental for the cabs (R. 10, 21-22) 
and collect and retain all fares received from the customers 
without any accounting therefor to the company. (R. 26). 
The company leases its cabs for either 6, 10 or 12 hours 
at a specified rental. In addition, the drivers keep a deposit 
of $15.00 with the company to insure payment of rental 
and agree to be responsible for damage to the cabs up to 
$50.00, to obey all federal, state and municipal laws, to 
accept the cab assigned by the company and not allow the 
cab to be driven by others (R. 10-11). Ordinary upkeep 
and maintenance of the cabs is the responsibility of the 
company (R. 11). The company provides a garage, main-
tains taxicab stands and furnishes a telephone and radio 
dispatching service. Public liability insurance is kept by 
the company. The only compensation received by the com-
pany for the cab and accompanying services is the specified 
rental plus whatever gas is purchased by the drivers from 
the company (the gas is sold at a discount) (R. 21-22). 
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Except in the case of irregular drivers (R. 24), the 
particular time when the cab is to be used by the driver 
is determined by mutual agreement and a so-called shift 
agreement (R. 13) is signed by the driver and made a part 
of the rental agreement. Each driver is furnished a short 
booklet giving certain advice and suggestions to the drivers 
(R. 18). These suggestions are not regulations of the 
company and there is no provision in the rental agreement 
or any other agreement between the company and the driver 
that requires the driver to conform to the recommendations 
and suggestions contained in the pamphlet. Since March 
1, 1955, when the leasing arrangement was initiated, the 
labor union to which most of the drivers had theretofore 
belonged, has been dissolved and the company now has no 
contract with any labor union (R. 25). 
When the company submitted its. first quarter 1955 
unemployment compensation report, no wages. were re-
ported for the drivers for the month of March. The com-
pany noted on the report "No taxicab drivers were employed 
during March. Taxicabs were leased to drivers". The 
Department of Employment Security thereupon investigated 
and on June 16, 1955, determined that the company should 
have reported "wages" of the drivers and made an order 
to that effect (R. 1-4). Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed 
to the Appeals Referee in the manner prescribed by law, a 
hearing was held and a decision was rendered September 
2, 1955 (R. 40-44). A further appeal was taken to the 
Board of Review of the Department of Employment Secur-
ity in the manner and within the time prescribed by law. 
The Board of Review thereafter considered the case and 
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4 
on October 14, 1955, affirmed the decision of the Appeals 
Referee (R. 53), whereupon the company appealed to this 
court within the time and in the manner prescribed by law. 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
It is well settled that what constitutes an employer and 
employee under the Utah Unemployment Compensation Act 
is determined by the statutory rules alone and not by the 
common law definitions of master and servant. Globe Grain 
& Milling Co. v. Indus. Com., 98 Utah 36, 91 P. 2d 512, reh. 
den., 97 P. 2d 582; Creameries of America v. Indus. Com., 
98 Utah 571, 102 P. 2d 300; Fuller Brush Co. v. Indus. Com., 
99 Utah 97, 104 P. 2d 201, 129 A. L. R. 511; Singer Sewing 
Mach. Co. v. Indus. Com., 104 Utah 175, 134 P. 2d 479, reh. 
den., 104 Utah 194, 141 P. 2d 694; Northern Oil Co. v. Indus. 
Com., 104 Utah 353, 140 P. 2d 329. These statutory rules are 
found in Sees. 35-4-22 (j) (1) and (5), U. C. A. 1953, and 
require a showing, first, that the alleged employee per-
formed services for the alleged employer, second, that such 
services were performed for wages or under a contract of 
hire and, third, that such serYices for \Yages or under a 
contract for hire are not excluded from the operation of the 
act by the tests specified in 35-4-22 (j) (5) (A, B & C). 
See the above cited cases and in addition National Tunnel 
Mines Co. v. Indus. Co1n., 99 Utah 39, 102 P. 2d 508; 
Powell v. Indus. Co1n., 116 Utah 385, 210 P. 2d 1006; 
Johanson B1"os. Builders v. Bd. of Revieu'~ 118 Utah 384, 
222 P. 2d 563; Leach v. Bd. of Ret'ie1c, (Utah), 260 P. 2d 
7 44. We are he·re not concerned with the third element, 
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the so-called A, B, C exclusionary test, and will limit our 
brief to a discussion of the first two questions, to-wit, did 
the lessees of plaintiff's cabs perform services for plaintiff 
and, if so, were such services performed for wages? 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE LESSEES OF PLAINTIFF'S CABS DID 
NOT PERFORM SERVICES FOR PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II 
THE LESSEES OF PLAINTIFF'S CABS DID 
NOT RECEIVE WAGES FROM PLAINTIFF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LESSEES OF PLAINTIFF'S CABS DID 
NOT PERFORM SERVICES FOR PLAINTIFF. 
It has been recognized by this Court as well as the 
courts of other jurisdictions that service performed essen-
tially for one's self is not service performed for an employer 
covered by the act. The most common instances of such 
a situation are where a sale or a lease is involved. Thus 
a Fuller Brush salesman was held not covered by the Act 
since he purchased the products he sold from the company 
and thereafter worked free from control of the company. 
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Fuller Brush Co. v. Indus. Com., supra. It has also been 
recognized that a lessor-lessee relationship is not a service 
relationship under the Act (National Tunnel Mines Co. v. 
Indus. Com., supra; Combined Metals Reduction Co. v. 
Indus. Com., 101 Utah 230, 116 P. 2d 929; Powell v. 
Indus. Com., supra) although in none of these cases did 
the facts show such a relationship. The exclusion of lessees 
from the coverage of the Act has also been recognized and 
applied in other jurisdictions. See Anno. 152 A. L. R. 520, 
164 A. L. R. 1411, 10 A. L. R. 2d 369. 
In Magruder v. YeUow Cab Co., (C. C. A. 4th 1944), 
141 F. 2d 324, 152 A. L. R. 516, affirming 49 F. Supp. 605, 
the precise question here involved was discussed. There, 
as here, the company leased cabs to drivers at a flat rate 
per day. The driver collected and retained all fares and 
made no accounting therefor. Drivers were free _to drive 
where and when they wished within the city limits, but 
were required to obey all laws and regulations concerning 
the operation of taxicabs. Public liability insurance was 
maintained by the company. The court held this relation-
ship to be merely a lease and not an employment under 
the Social Security Act. 
In U. S. v. Davis, (C. A. Dist. Col., 1946), 154 F. 2d 
314, the same result 'vas reached. The facts were virtually 
identical to the facts in the Yellow Cab case and this case. 
It should be noted that the Davis case involved a company 
who, like plaintiff, maintained a central switchboard for 
the convenience of its lessees, restricted use of the cabs to 
the city limits and required lessees to keep trip records as 
provided by law. 
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See also New Deal Cab Co. v. Fahs, (C. A. 5th, 1949), 
174 F. 2d 318; Economy Cab Co. v. Fahs, (C. A. 5th, 1949), 
174 F. 2d 321; and Co-op Cab Co. v. Allen, (D. C. Ga., 
1947), 82 F. Supp. 695. 
In the case of Jones v. Goodson, (C. C. A. lOth, 1941), 
121 F. 2d 176, the 1Oth Circuit reached a contrary result 
because the control of the lessees was much greater. The 
drivers were required to buy all oil and gas from the com-
pany, were subject to discharge at will for disorderliness, 
violation of city ordinances or overcharging. The drivers 
were required to inform the company of their whereabouts 
at least once each hour. Such strict control was held to 
create an employment situation. 
The Goodson case was distinguished in both the Yellow 
Cab and Davis cases and in the later lOth Circuit case of 
Woods v. Z..licholas, (C. C. A. lOth, 1947), 163 F. 2d 615. 
In the Nicholas case, the court emphasized that the tax-
payer "did not have any right of control in respect to the 
method and manner in which [the lessees] did their work." 
Among other things, the lessee was not controlled as to 
where or when he drove, was paid no wage by the taxpayer 
and received and retained all fares from customers without 
accountability. "[The taxpayer] merely furnished the 
license and certificate of convenience and necessity, as well 
as certain facilities, for which he was compensated [by the 
lessee-drivers]." In holding that an employment relation-
ship did not exist, the court did not apply the common law 
principles of master-servant, but treated the question as 
being governed by the purposes sought to be accomplished 
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by the Social Security Act, that is, a statutory definition 
rather than a common law definition of employee was used. 
That lack of control is an important element in deter-
mining the existence of a service or non -service relationship 
is established by the decisions of this court. Fuller Brush 
Co. v. Indus. Com., supra; Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Indus. 
Com., supra; National Tunnel Mines Co. v. Ind. Com., 
supra (where a lessor-lessee relationship was involved); 
Powell v. Ind. Com., supra. Note particularly Justice Wolfe's 
concurrence in Combined Metals Reduction Co. v. Ind. Com., 
supra, where a detailed analysis of the elements of control 
was made. 
The Appeals Referee conceded that "the company has 
sincerely attempted to reduce to a minimum the element of 
control in the performance of the service," (R. 43), yet 
implied that control was still present in that the company 
assigned vehicles, assigned shifts and required reports. An 
identical contention was made in Party Cab Co. v. U. S., 
(C. A. 7th, 1949), 172 F. 2d 87, 10 A. L. R. 2d 358, a Social 
Security case. In answer, the court stated (10 A. L. R. 2d 
at 366) : 
"The weakness of this argument on control lies 
in the fact that the elements relied upon by the 
Board are matters '""hich concern the plaintiff's 
business rather than the serYices performed by the 
drivers. The matter of control 'vhich is material 
is that 'vhich the plaintiff exercised over the drivers 
during the period they were in possession of the 
cabs rather than what the plaintiff might do either 
prior or subsequent to such period. Considered in 
this light, any control exercised by the plaintiff was 
quite meagre." 
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Similarly, the company here exercises an extremely 
limited control of the drivers while they are in possession 
of the cabs. They are not required to wear uniforms, nor 
to remain at any specified place (Rental Agreement, Par. 
6d, R. 12). So far as the company is ·concerned, the drivers 
can choose the most likely spot within the city for custo-
mers, leaving other cab stations unattended (R. 29, 30). 
The drivers are not required to accept any calls (Rental 
Agreement, Par. 6c, R. 12). They are not required to avail 
themselves of the telephone and radio dispatching service 
of the company (R. 22, 29). They may drive or not drive 
during the period of the lease, or for that matter, can use 
the cabs for their own personal use rather than in the 
carriage of pasengers. They are not required to obey any 
rules and regulations of the company, although they are 
required to attend safety meetings. (However, such meet-
ings are not, in fact, held, R. 27.) They are not required 
to purchase gasoline from the company, although they 
agree to do so whenever possible. They are not required 
to accept a shift assignment. That is a matter arrived at 
by mutual agreement (R. 23). They are required to obey 
the laws and regulations of the federal, city and state gov-
ernments with respect to the operation of the taxicabs ; 
yet that is a requirement imposed by operation of law, 
binding upon them regardless of any specification in the 
Rental Agreement. The only real limitation on the drivers 
while they are in possession of the cab is the restriction 
on out-of-town trips; yet this is merely a reasonable re-
striction to safeguard the company's ownership of the cab 
similar to the common provisions in conditional sales con-
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tracts that the vehicle will not be taken outside the state. 
It should be noted that out-of-town is not merely outside 
the city limits, but a trip of 15 miles outside the city limits. 
Thus in practical operation, the driver is able to serve the 
principal area of business, that is, Salt Lake City and its 
suburbs, and will be governed by the restriction only in the 
rare case where a customer requires transportation for a 
greater distance. 
Consideration should also be given to the fact that the 
company, under this method of operation, has no contract 
whatsoever with the customers who use the cabs. The driv-
ers are not fulfilling a contract between the customers and 
the company as was the case in Singer Sewing Machine v. 
Indus. Com., supra; Creameries of America v. Indus. Com., 
supra; Salt Lake Tribune v. Indus. Com., 99 Utah 259, 102 
P. 2d 307; and Leach v. Bd. of Review, supra. Here the 
drivers themselves contract with the customers and the 
company has nothing to do with either the initiation or 
performance of such contracts. 
The Appeals Referee emphasized that the advertising 
of cab service was done by the company and in the name 
of the company, and that the driver had nothing to do with 
this nor received any benefit from it. Certainly, more 
people are likely to use a Yell ow Cab as opposed to some 
other cab after an advertising campaign is carried on and 
certainly this will benefit the drivers by increased patron-
age and thus increased driver profits. Such an arrange-
ment can make no difference to . the relationship of the 
parties. Indeed, it has the effect of confirming a more 
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definite lessor-lessee relationship. As stated by the District 
Court in Magruder v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 F. Supp. at 609: 
"The cab company's public advertisements, uni-
form color scheme and maintenance of call boxes 
were an effective means of making popular its cabs 
and thereby enabling it to lease or hire them to 
drivers on terms it deemed satisfactory." (emphasis 
added.) 
See also Martin v. Wichita Cab Co., 161 Kan. 510, 170 P. 2d 
147 at 152. 
In essence the business of the company has in fact 
changed from a business of providing taxicab service to 
the public to a business of leasing cabs to drivers who may 
or may not provide such service as their self-interest dic-
tates. The Appeals Referee seemed to assume that because 
the city license and certificate of public convenience and 
necessity from the Public Service Commission is held by 
the company and is nontransferable, that the company could 
not change its business to that of leasing cabs. Such an 
argument ignores the actual facts of the situation. It is 
basically irrelevant~ for the question to be determined here 
is the relationship between the company and the drivers, 
not the relationship between the company and the city and 
state. The company-driver relationship depends on the 
contract between the parties. Magruder v. Yellow Cab Co., 
141 F. 2d 324 at 326, 152 A. L. R. 516 at 520. As was stated 
in Parks Cab Co. v. Annunzio, 412 Ill. 549, 107 N. E. 2d 
853 at 855: 
"The Unemployment Compensation Act deals 
with realities of economic life. It is with these 
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same realities that we are concerned in determining 
questions which arise in the course of its adminis-
tration. Issues as to status are determined by ap-
plying the terms of the statute to the facts as they 
exist * * * ." 
and further, 
"* * * the fact that the contract may have 
violated the city ordinances is not determinative of 
the actual relationship between Parks Cab and its 
drivers. We need not and do not decide whether 
there has been, in fact, a violation here. * * * 
In our view economic facts as they actually exist 
are determinative here." 
Even if the company is still considered to be in the 
taxicab business, that fact can make no difference to the 
relationship between the drivers and the company for this 
taxicab business can be operated by drivers who are not 
employees. As the court in New Deal Cab Company v. 
Fahs, supra, stated: 
"But it is undeniable that the company itself 
was running a business of carrying passengers for 
hire rather than the mere casual rental of cars; for 
it had a city license so to do, and there would be 
little demand for its cars otherwise. But it could, if 
it chose, get the work done by independent contrac-
tors instead of by hired employees. This is in effect 
what it did, but in a very loose wa.y, because tke 
drivers did not exp'ressly agree to accornplish tkis 
work. Self interest alone seems to have been relied 
on, for hauling passengers would be the driver's 
best source to make money, and to meet his positive 
obligation to pay rental and for gasoline." (empha-
sis added.) 
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The Appeals Referee also considered that a service 
relationship existed because the lease was. not a lease of 
specific property, that is, a particular cab was not leased 
but merely any cab available and assigned to the driver 
by the company. With all due respect to the Referee, we 
are unable to agree with this contention. Concededly, a 
true lease is not involved here for the correct nomenclature 
for a lease of personal property is a bailment (Wasatch 
Livestock Loan Co. v. Nielson, 90 Utah 331, 61 P. 2d 616 
at 619), but there is no requirement that a bailment be for 
a specific piece of property. A bailment is merely a transfer 
of possession of personal property to be used by the trans-
feree temporarily and returned by him in accordance with 
his agreement with the transferor. It could certainly not 
be contended that the lease of a "drive-it-yourself" car was 
any the less a lease because a specific car was not agreed 
upon in advance. Customers of such a business rent a car 
of a certain type or sometimes of a certain make, but rarely 
designate a specific car which they will lease. Similarly, 
the driver leases the use of a cab and when that cab is 
transferred to him he has a well established property right 
in the cab for the period of the bailment or lease. No such 
question has ever been raised in any of the cases concern-
ing the question of employment as defined in the Social 
Security Act or Unemployment Compensation Acts. Indeed, 
such contracts have specifically been characterized as bail-
ments. See Magruder v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, where the 
court said: 
"vVe see in this contract the hired use of a thing, 
the classical bailment known as locatio rei, only that 
and nothing more." 
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See also Martin v. Wichita Cab Co., supra. 
Should this court affirm the decision of the Department 
of Employment Security, a very unusual situation will exist. 
The Industrial Commission has already determined that 
the rental arrangement under which the company is now 
leasing cabs does not make the drivers employees of the 
company under the W orkmens' Compensation Act. (Bacell 
0. Angell v. Salt Lake Transportation Company, Claim No. 
5618, R. 14-17). To the same effect are RockefeUer v. In-
dustrial Commission, (Utah), 197 Pac. 1038 and Rose v. 
Black & White Cab Co., (Ark., 1953), 258 S. W. 2d 50. Is 
it not an anomalous situation, therefore, to require the com-
pany to provide unemployment benefits to the drivers and 
yet not compensate the same drivers in case they are in-
jured or killed in the course of their driving? If public 
policy is to be considered, certainly the preference should 
be given to compensation for injury or death, rather than 
to compensation for mere unemployment. 
Apart from this situation, the Department of Employ-
ment Security will itself be in a difficult position should 
the driver-lessees be considered 'vithin the Act. How will 
they determine, for example, \Vhether a driver is entitled 
to benefits when he voluntarily refuses to sign a rental 
agreement on the company's terms or "~in he be considered 
unemployed only when the company refuses to renew the 
rental agreement? Even in the latter situation, the dis-
continuance of the agreement is for good cause-the driv-
er's breach of contract. 
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POINT II 
THE LESSEES OF PLAINTIFF'S CABS DID 
NOT RECEIVE WAGES FROM PLAINTIFF. 
As previously stated, the drivers who lease cabs from 
the plaintiff pay plaintiff a flat rate per 6, 10 or 12 hour 
period. The company at no time pays the drivers. anything, 
nor do they pay any obligations of the driver which could 
be considered a constructive payment. The entire consid-
eration received for the driver's services is. paid by the 
customers who use the cabs. The entire risk of profit and 
loss from the operation of the cabs is solely and exclusively 
on the drivers. If they do not haul enough customers to 
pay their rental and gas costs, they lose money. To the 
extent that their earnings exceed the rental and gas costs, 
they make a profit. This cannot be considered wages paid 
by the plaintiff. 
In Fuller Brush Company v. Indus. Com., supra, this 
court defined wages as used in the Unemployment Compen-
sation Act. It was stated there : 
"But it is not all personal service performed 
for another that comes within the act, but only such 
as is performed 'for wages or under any contract of 
hire.' 'Wages' is defined as all compensation payable 
for personal services, rendered for another under a 
contract of hire, express or implied. This compensa-
tion is based upon and computed upon service ren-
dered, and is not derived from the accomplishment 
of a purpose or achievement of an objective, by the 
person receiving the remuneration, through a dif-
ference in two prices. The essential elements of 
wages are that they form a direct obligation against 
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the employer, in favor of the employee; that when 
the service is performed the compensation, if any, 
accrues and becomes payable regardless of the suc-
cess or failure of the undertaking; that any profits 
or earning over and above costs of the service ac-
crues to the employer, and any loss as a result of the 
undertaking or service must be borne by the em.. 
ployer. It is not essential that the wage move di-
rectly from the employer to the employee, as where 
the employee works on commissions, deducts his 
commission from a collection and remits the 'nets', 
but it is essential that the remuneration accrues 
from the product or service of the employer, and 
would accrue to him except for the fact that the 
employee is entitled to retain or receive it as re-
muneration under his contract of hire. The term 
'contract of hire' is not defined in the act probably 
because the legislature felt that the expression was 
so well established, understood and definite, that it 
needs no further amplification or exposition. It is 
used in its common meaning and acceptation. It is 
an agreement 'vhereby one undertakes or obligates 
himself to render personal service for another for 
a remuneration to be paid because the service was 
rendered, regardles of the element of profit or loss 
resulting from the work, endeavor. or undertaking." 
(emphasis added.) 
Here there is no obligation of the plaintiff to pay the 
drivers anything "~hatsoever. The success or failure of 
the undertaking is dependent upon the ability of the driver 
to carry a sufficient number of passengers to make a profit 
over his costs. None of this profit accrues to the plaintiff 
and the entire loss is the responsibility of the driver. The 
"essential elen1ents of "rages" as defined in the Fuller Brush 
case are not present here. We do not here contend that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
merely because no ren1uneration passes directly from the 
I' 
I. plaintiff to the drivers that no wages are paid, for in cer-
J tain circumstances a third person can pay the "wages" 
without affecting the employment status under the Act. 
See Creameries of America v. Indus. Com., supra, and Salt 
Lake Tribune v. Indus. Com., supra. We do contend, how-
. ever, that where the compensation is paid by a third person 
to the alleged employee, where the risk of profit or loss is 
exclusively on the "employee" and where the "employer" 
receives no part of such compensation, that wages are not 
paid within the meaning of the Act. 
Of equal importance, perhaps, is the fact that the 
drivers are not accountable to the plaintiff for the fares 
they collect. How, then, is the plaintiff to determine what 
the "wages" of the drivers are so that it can pay the unem-
ployment compensation tax? Certainly, it is not fair or 
proper to do as the Departn1ent of Employment Security 
did and pick a wage figure out of thin air. See the letter 
of June 16, 1955, to the plaintiff (R. 1-4) where, on page 
2, the writer stated, "However, the company had no record 
of the earnings of such drivers so it was necessary to arbi-
trarily arrive at an equitable wage figure. The total num-
ber of hours the cabs were leased was divided by 8 to 
determine the number of 8-hour shifts and an average earn-
ing computed at $6.00 per 8-hour shift." 
Thus, the Department assumed each lessee made a 
profit of $6.00 every eight hours, despite the undisputed 
evidence that the profits of drivers fluctuated from time 
to time (R. 26) and that the company has no way of de-
termining the amount of fares collected (R. 26). It is no 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
answer to say, as the Appeals Referee did, that the com. 
pany "could if it so ·chose again determine the amount of 
such remuneration as it did in the past". The company 
cannot so choose for, like the drivers, it is bound by the 
rental agreement which does not require drivers to account 
for the fares they collect. To collect a tax based on such an 
arbitrary figure is erroneous, unjust and unlawful. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we contend that the deci-
sion of the Appeals Referee is not supported by the evidence 
but, on the contrary, the evidence shows as a matter of 
law that the drivers who lease cabs from the Salt Lake 
Transportation Company are not performing services for 
nor receiving wages from the company within the mean-
ing of the Utah Unemployment Compensation Act. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ATHOL RAWLINS, 
H. R. V\'ALDO, JR., 
OF RAY, RAWLINS, 
JONES & HENDERSON, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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